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I. INTRODUCTION
For many years it was easy to succumb to the temptation to teach
separation of powers theory as "Richard Nixon" law. The leading cases
about executive privilege arose out of Watergate, and controversies over
impoundment, war powers, and impeachment were directly connected to the
Watergate experience. In this essay, I want to suggest that treating sepa-
ration of powers law as "Richard Nixon" law is descriptively accurate and
distorted at the same time, and normatively misleading. It is descriptively
accurate because the modem law of separation of powers has been shaped
by the legacy of Watergate, which includes a substantial period of divided
government. It is descriptively distorted because important separation of
powers controversies cannot easily be linked to Watergate. It is normatively
misleading because the political context-the sense that contemporary
separation of powers controversies are indeed the legacy of Watergate-has
obscured the fact that separation of powers controversies now arise because
of the transformation of modem government into a complex bureaucratic
state. This transformation has tom separation of powers theory away from
its traditional base, described by the metaphor of "checks and balances," and
has left separation of powers theory without a new base.
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II. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS "RICHARD NIXON" LAW
A list of Watergate-connected cases establishes the importance of
Watergate for separation of powers theory.' First there are the executive
privilege cases. United States v. Nixon,2 the leading case raising questions
of privilege in criminal prosecutions, was obviously part of Watergate.
Cases that claimed damages from high executive officials including the
President, who then raised claims of privilege, gained credibility because
Watergate had discredited Nixon.3 The independent counsel case dealt with
the statute adopted to avoid future "Saturday Night massacres."4 Buckley
v. Valeo5 disposed of a challenge to the means of selecting the Federal
Election Commission.6 It arose out of campaign finance reforms adopted
to eliminate one type of abuse that, it was felt, contributed to Watergate.
Finally, there is the Walter Nixon case in which the Court held that judicial
review of impeachment processes was barred by the political question
doctrine.7 The Chief Justice's opinion was more than typically confused,
but its motivation appears to have been concern over the possibility that the
courts might be called upon to review a presidential impeachment, a concern
triggered in part by the Watergate experience.
Beyond the cases directly connected to Watergate, other separation of
powers controversies seem part of its legacy. The War Powers Resolution,
for example, a perennial source of issues for classroom discussion, resulted
from the inter-branch suspicion that, on the President's side, led to
Watergate. Even the legislative veto decision might be understood as part
of Watergate's legacy.' Congress had been using legislative vetoes for a
generation, and presidents had been interposing mild objections for as long.
1. I examined the chapters on separation of powers in several leading constitutional law
casebooks to determine what proportion of their pages was devoted to cases closely linked
to Watergate. WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9th ed. 1993),
had the smallest proportion (16%), followed by GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (2d ed. 1991), with 23%, and GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th ed.
1991), with 26%. Taking account of the fact that casebooks tend to be dominated by recent
cases, these proportions seem high enough to be noteworthy.
2. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
3. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
4. Morrison v. Olsen, 487 U.S. 654, 663 (1988).
5. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
6. Id. Buckley is more widely known, of course, for its holding that free speech
principles limit Congress' power to regulate campaign finance.
7. Nixon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 732 (1993).
8. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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It might be argued, however, that the issue came to a head because
Watergate exacerbated tensions between the departments.
The standard account of Watergate's legacy for separation of powers
theory is directly normative. On this account, Watergate demonstrated the
dangers of concentrated governmental power. To put it perhaps overdrama-
tically, the New Deal, the Warren Court, the New Frontier, and the Great
Society had lulled Americans into believing that a powerful national
government was always a benign force for progress; Richard Nixon and
Watergate showed that it was not. Before Watergate, constitutional theory
and decisional law concentrated on the individual rights provisions of the
Constitution. These were seen as the primary mechanisms, enforced by the
courts, by which the Constitution protected individual rights. Watergate
directed scholarly and judicial attention back to the indirect protections of
individual rights in the Constitution, that is, to separation of powers.
There are other, and in my view more important, connections between
Watergate and modem separation of powers controversies. Those controver-
sies arise when Congress and the President are at odds, which is most likely
to occur when the departments are controlled by different political parties.
Accordingly, the most significant political phenomenon of the past
generation was the permanently divided government, with Congress
controlled by Democrats and the presidency by Republicans. Until 1993,
the only period of unified government, the Carter presidency, was itself a
direct consequence of Watergate.
In an important way, though, divided government may well have
resulted from Watergate too. In 1968, it seemed to some that the New Deal
coalition had crumbled and was about to be replaced by a new national
Republican coalition, which would control both the presidency and
Congress.9  Watergate interrupted that process. The public, wary of
concentrated power as a result of Watergate, appears to have concluded that
divided government is attractive.
Divided government, however, produces separation of powers
controversies. Policy differences between the departments generate
legislative proposals and executive initiatives to which the other department
takes exception. Ordinarily, these controversies are resolved by political
negotiation during which the departments reach compromises acceptable to
each. But over an extended period, divided government produces separation
of powers cases as well, because it affects bargaining strategies. Specifical-
ly, after an extended period in which one party controls the presidency, the
9. See KEvN PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJoiuTY (1969).
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President will be more reluctant to compromise with Congress. For
predictable political reasons, a sustained period of divided government will
lead to a judiciary dominated by appointees of the President's party; the
Senate cannot resist more than sporadically the transformation of the federal
courts that the President's power to initiate appointments allows. As a
result, litigators may think that the courts have become allies of one side in
separation of powers controversies. Partisans of the President may think
that the possibility of prevailing in litigation is great enough to allow them
to stiffen their positions in political negotiations. Therefore, controversies
that might have ended through negotiation instead turn into court cases.
These are structural characteristics that lead to more separation of
powers cases after a sustained period of divided government. The particular
form division took in the past generation contributed to the proliferation of
such cases as well. The competing parties had different views about the
importance of strong presidential authority. Republicans desired a strong
presidency in foreign affairs and a weak national government in domestic
affairs, whereas Democrats wanted a weak presidency in foreign affairs and
a strong national government in domestic affairs.
Thus, in foreign affairs, the parties were directly opposed on questions
of presidential power, and the Democrats, in control of Congress, were in
a position to transform this opposition into separation of powers controver-
sies. Watergate itself arose from President Nixon's concern about opposi-
tion to his conduct of foreign policy. The repeated controversies about war
powers and the Iran-contra affair are similar in structure.
The impoundment issue,"0 which briefly flared up during the Nixon
presidency, typifies separation of powers controversies in the domestic
arena. Though not new," the issue recurred during the Nixon Administra-
tion when President Nixon "transformed an occasional practice into a special
test of wills with Congress."' 2  Impoundment became an issue because
Democrats wanted a strong national government, and found the President
thwarting their desires. To no one's surprise, Democrats tried to develop
10. Impoundment occurs when the President or other U.S. government officers take
action, or fail to take action, that precludes the obligation or expenditure of Congress' budget
authority. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 756 (6th ed. 1990).
II. For historical development of the impoundment issue, see STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE
WARS OF WATERGATE 133-34 (1990).
12. Id. at 133. During a press conference on January 31, 1973, President Nixon stated
that "the Constitutional right for the President of the United States to impound funds [,] and
that is not to spend money, when the spending of money would mean .. increasing prices
or increasing taxes for all the people, that right is absolutely clear." Id.
[Vol. 181768
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ways to accomplish their goals without the President's participation, and
Republican Presidents tried to develop ways to reduce the domestic role of
the national government. 3
The normative and political accounts of Watergate's legacy are
connected, as a matter of constitutional theory. "Checks and balances" is
one of the central images of separation of powers theory, or, as James
Madison put it, separation of powers protects liberty by setting ambition to
counteract ambition.'" Politicians are ambitious, in the Madisonian sense,
when they seek to protect the prerogatives of their offices against intrusions
by occupants of other offices. Following this logic, divided government
epitomizes how separation of powers serves liberty.
The foregoing account of Watergate's legacy for separation of powers
theory is surely correct, in one sense. Watergate did heighten concern for
concentrated power, and it did contribute to the development of divided
government. As I argue next, however, viewing modem separation of
powers law as "Richard Nixon" law has distorted that law and, more
importantly, has obscured deeper sources of modem separation of powers
problems.
III. GOVERNMENTAL INNOVATIONS AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Intensification of partisan conflict, caused by a divided government and
principled concern for controlling concentrated power, has heightened the
stakes in separation of powers controversies. One result, ironically, has
been to mislead scholars about the nature of those controversies. This is the
underside of seeing separation of powers law as "Richard Nixon" law.
Rather than expressing deep conflict between a Republican president and a
Democratic Congress, the conflicts arise because of the modernization of the
national government.
Viewing the modem law of separation of powers as the legacy of
Watergate induces scholars to consider the implications of divided
government and partisan conflict. The Madisonian emphasis on ambition
counteracting ambition seems to address those questions as well. Yet, unless
we place Madison's concerns into a modem context, that emphasis is likely
to be normatively misleading and descriptively distorted. Unfortunately,
adjusting those concerns to take account of modem conditions proves quite
13. This is a formula for repeated clashes, some of which will end up in court.
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1974).
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difficult, and may partially explain why the image of Watergate continues
to dominate separation of powers thinking; we have nothing to put in its
place.
The standard account I have given is descriptively distorted because it
fails to explain some of the most important characteristics of modem
separation of powers law. Although "Richard Nixon" law makes United
States v. Nixon 5 the paradigmatic case, a better paradigm is the Sentencing
Commission decision, Mistretta v. United States.1 6  Mistretta does not
easily fit into the standard account, yet it exemplifies modem separation of
powers problems in several ways.
First, the Sentencing Commission was clearly a technical adaptation to
deal with what national law-makers saw as a modem problem: sentencing
disparity resulting from the proliferation of federal crimes and the expansion
of the federal bench. 7 Second, the decision adopted what has come to be
called a "functional" analysis of separation of powers issues. According to
proponents of functional analysis, courts should assess innovations in
government structure by considering whether the innovation is a sensible
attempt to deal with a difficult modem problem in a way that does not
threaten to undermine fundamental constitutional values.'" Functional
analysis almost inevitably leads the Court to uphold governmental innova-
tions against separation of powers challenges.
The Court's functional analysis is not a well-suited tool for dealing
with sharp partisan conflicts between the President and Congress. The
Court has sometimes used a more formal analysis, 9 particularly in the
legislative veto decision. Most commentators, however, believe that the
Court's formalistic decisions are deviations from a more consistent
commitment to functionalism.2" Mistretta and the independent counsel
decision are more typical of the functionalist pattern: Despite occasional
invalidations, as a general matter the Court has rejected separation of power
15. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
16. 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (constitutionality of Sentencing Commission challenged on
several grounds including separation of powers).
17. Id. at 363-65.
18. For my analysis of this issue, see Mark Tushnet, The Sentencing Commission and
Constitutional Theory: Bowls and Plateaus in Separation of Powers Theory, 66 S. CAL. L.
REv. 581 (1992).
19. See id.
20. One reason for the belief that separation of powers controversies are more serious
and more contentious than they were in the past may be that Justice Scalia, the newspapers'
and scholars' favorite justice, is an articulate proponent of a formalism that the Court, in fact,
has by and large rejected.
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challenges to federal statutes. The Court's implicit judgment in preferring
functionalism appears to be that most separation of powers controversies are
not the product of sharp partisan conflict in which they are called upon to
side with either the President who appointed them or the Senate that
confirmed them.2
The standard account relies on the Madisonian vision. For Madison,
the President's ambition counteracted Congress's. Direct political confronta-
tions were the mechanism by which separation of powers protected liberty,
as each side sought to advance its own interests and found itself checked by
the other. Equally important, the disputes were personalized, as the term
ambition suggests. That is, political interests led particular people to fight
other people over competing agendas. One small indication of what can be
called the personalization of ambition is the Framers' choice of a unitary
over a plural executive. By placing the executive power in the hands of a
single person, the Framers believed that they could promote both energy and
responsibility in the Executive, and individual responsibility would be
enforced by impeachment to remove "the" wrong-doer from office.
The Madisonian perspective leads to a positivist account of separation
of powers law. On this view, the Constitution does not prescribe any
particular outcome in separation of powers controversies. Rather, it
establishes a framework for political contention, and validates whatever
results from that contention.22
This positivism, however, is hard to sustain under modem conditions.
Although strongly originalist contemporary discussions of the separation of
powers continue to speak in personalized terms,23 they are difficult to
employ in connection with a modem, bureaucratic government. We can say
that the legislative veto is a mechanism by which Congress (seen as a unit)
attempts to control the President (seen as an individual). The reality,
however, is that the veto is an attempt by congressional committees and
their staffs to exercise some continuing supervision over the behavior of
lower-level bureaucrats. In Chadha, for example, "Congress" was not
concerned that "the President" had adopted too generous a standard for
determining when to waive deportation in hardship cases; rather, the chair
21. Note, however, that a more careful phrasing of the proposition about the Court's role
is that the perception among partisans, that the Court will be an ally, can generate litigation
in cases that otherwise might be negotiated to a solution. Eventually, however, a perception
that experience proves to be inaccurate presumably disappears.
22. For some qualifications and elaborations, see Tushnet, supra note 18, at 582.
23. See, e.g., Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary
Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1153 (1992).
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of the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Immigration and
Naturalization Service was concerned that the bureaucrats in charge of
making hardship decisions were using too generous a standard. 24
Similarly, when Justice Scalia criticized the innovation of the
independent counsel statute in Morrison v. Olson,25 his description of the
Commission as an effort to aggrandize one "department" at the expense of
another did not capture the more complex reality. Noting, as the Watergate
legacy suggests, the immediate partisan context'of contemporary disputes,
Justice Scalia saw the independent counsel statute as "Congress's" attempt
to reduce "the President's" power by allowing it to compel investigations
that the President would not otherwise allow to go forward.26 If we move
back a bit from the immediate context of divided government, though, we
might see the independent counsel statute as an effort to deal with problems
that arise precisely when we can no longer personalize the presidency
because the President has so many subordinates over whom he has little
direct control. Because the executive is in fact no longer unitary, it is
misleading to insist on "the President's" responsibility for all that happens
in the executive departments.
Once we abandon the personalization of ambition, the Madisonian
positivist perspective cannot be sustained, for it relied on counterbalancing
forces of political ambition, which can no longer be located anywhere in the
complex bureaucracies of the modem state. Ambition, of course, remains:
members of the House of Representatives want to run for the Senate,
senators want to run for the presidency, presidents (and members of
Congress) want to be reelected. These ambitions, though, are not rooted in
the institutions themselves. Ambitious politicians look out for themselves,
not for the prerogatives of the departments in which they find themselves.
Other originalist perspectives are equally flawed, for more familiar
reasons. Suppose, contrary to Madison, that the Framers did embed in the
Constitution a particular vision of the proper relation between "the
executive" and "Congress." As critics of originalism have shown, the
transformation of government means precisely that the Framers' vision
cannot resolve contemporary controversies.
More generally, the complexity of governing in the contemporary
world-the problems of a national economy's integration into an internation-
al system and the problems of establishing or maintaining a just and orderly
society in an ethnically and socially pluralist nation-means that new
24. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926.
25. 487 U.S. 654, 701-03 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 703.
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instruments of government are likely to be developed. We have become
accustomed to one such innovation: the administrative agency. Separation
of powers purists suggested that such agencies are unconstitutional, 7 but
the Court, in Bowsher v. Synar,2" went out of its way to indicate its
disapproval of that position.29 It is only because we had not adjusted to
other innovations, such as the independent counsel or the Sentencing
Commission, that constitutional challenges seemed credible.
In this sense, the novel methods of government that have generated
separation of powers cases are not the legacy of Watergate. They are,
instead, the products of modem life. As such, however, analyzing them
with constitutional concepts predicated upon images of a government such
as existed in 1789 is not likely to be helpful. If neither the presidency nor
Congress is unitary, for example, the personalization associated with the
Madisonian idea of ambition counteracting ambition simply does not speak
to the institutions of government we now have. Analyses that pursue that
idea, or indeed any other predicated on an understanding of the constitution-
al order of older institutions, may be faithful to the Constitution in an
originalist sense yet unfaithful to the constitutional project.
That project is to assure that the institutions we actually have be
regulated by law, and that all who exercise public power are governed by
the rule of law. The question then becomes whether it is possible to
develop an approach to separation of powers analysis that is both descrip-
tively accurate-that captures the fundamentals of modem government-and
normatively acceptable-that ensures the rule of law. The difficulty is
particularly acute in connection with separation of powers disputes. In the
constitutional scheme, the separation of powers might be called a "trans-
substantive" method of protecting liberty and promoting effective govern-
ment.30 Separation of powers controversies ought to be resolved, accord-
ing to this method, without regard to the underlying political issue
provoking the controversy. So, for example, whether the Constitution has
room for a special counsel must be decided without regard to the actions of
27. See, e.g., Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub noma.
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Geoffrey Miller, IndependentAgencies, 1986 SUP.
CT. REv. 71.
28. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
29. Id. at 725 n.4.
30. I adopt 1he term from discussions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g.,
Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718, 718 (1975).
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Richard Nixon or Ronald Reagan, except to the extent that those actions
reveal something systemic about how the modem presidency operates.
To decide these questions trans-substantively, courts must ask whether,
taking the way the modem government operates into account, liberty and
efficiency will be better promoted by allowing some governmental
innovation or by barring it. The functionalist approach now prevailing on
the Court is problematic because it so often amounts to a rubber-stamp for
institutional innovations: If Congress believed that the innovations serve
useful functions without threatening the balance of power that promotes
liberty, the courts are not well-positioned to disagree. The Court's
functionalism, thus, may simply be how it expresses its resigned acceptance
of what the Justices understand to be the inevitable modernization of the
national government. If in this view modernization might not be a transcen-
dentally good thing, but it is going to happen no matter what, then why
bother to pretend that there are constitutional barriers to modernization?
Understood in this way, functionalism may satisfy the demand for a
descriptively accurate approach to separation of powers problems. It hardly
seems to satisfy the demand for a normatively attractive one. The view that
such problems are the legacy of Watergate may stand in the way of
developing a more satisfactory approach. Somehow, judges and scholars
have to figure out a way to identify which of the innovations modem life
is likely to bring forward ought to be rejected as unconstitutional. Treating
the problems as the legacy of Watergate does not seem likely to help in that
endeavor.
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